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Summary  
 
What has been done? Since 2004, Mali has used four instruments to periodically 
stabilize domestic cereal prices (millet, sorghum, maize and rice): (i) a ban on exports 
(2007 and 2008), (ii) a recovery plan to boost production through input subsidies (for 
rice in 2008; for rice, maize and wheat in 2009), (iii) public stocks (especially since 2005, 
when two new types of stocks were set up (the State Intervention Stock and cereal 
banks), and (iv) tax exemptions on cereal imports (for rice and maize in 2005, 2007, 2008 
and 2009 and for maize only in 2005). The outreach of these government interventions 
as well as their modalities have varied considerably, depending on the instrument, the 
year and products targeted.  
  
How has it been implemented? The decision-making process is complex. The different 
instruments are often managed by different agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Commerce 
for export bans and tax exemptions on imports; the Ministry of Agriculture for recovery 
plans; the cereal bank management committee for decentralized stocks, located in 703 
of the country’s municipalities). Decisions are made by the President and the office of 
the Prime Minister, with support from the Food Security Commission. The effective 
implementation of policies has sometimes proved difficult. Export bans have been 
circumvented. Importers have not always benefited from tax exemptions. The 
subsidized inputs for producers often arrive late, and in insufficient quantities 
(particularly for seeds). Finally, purchases for certain public stocks at times came too late 
(especially for the State Intervention Stock, which lacks working capital to make timely 
purchases).  
 
What were the effects? The ban on exports has not managed to discourage cereal 
exports. Not enough, at least, to affect prices in Mali. The bans have not had the 
expected moderating effect on consumer prices, but nor have they penalized 
producers—or only very marginally. Policies to boost production have had a moderate 
impact on production levels (+ 20% below the stated goal of a 50% increase) and prices 
(which declined slightly and stabilized at a high level). Public stocks have had little effect 
on prices. Perhaps they have helped absorb fluctuations due to seasonality, but they 
have failed to contain increases in times of crisis. This is probably due to the small size 
these operations: only 28,000 tons were released during the crisis of 2005 (15,000 tons 
of dry cereals + 13,000 tons of rice) and 53,000 tons during the 2008 (32,000 tons of dry 
cereals + 21 000 tons of rice). The tax exemptions on imports has had a moderating 
effect on prices of imported rice, but have also driven down prices of locally produced 
cereals (including dry cereals). This is what happened in the Kayes region in 2005 and in 
various other areas in 2009. This phenomenon holds true for both consumer prices and 
producer prices.  
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Table 22 : Effects on retail prices in Kayes  of VAT exemption and tax exemption on imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What recommendations could be derived? The instruments that have been 
found to be potentially effective are tax exemptions on imports, recovery plans 
to boost production, and public stocks (provided they grow in size). The form of 
governance and decision-making process is at least as important as the choice of 
instruments. For example, for public stocks to be effective, their administrators 
need working capital at their disposal. Similarly, for tax exemption measures to 
be effective, importers must actually benefit from them. This implies defining the 
terms of these exemptions with the importers, and ensuring compliance through 
control measures. 
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